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Abstract—This paper develops a new cooperative jamming
protocol, termed accumulate-and-jam (AnJ), to improve physical
layer security in wireless communications. Specifically, a full-
duplex (FD) friendly jammer is deployed to secure the direct
communication between source and destination in the presence
of a passive eavesdropper. We consider the friendly jammer as
an energy-constrained node without embedded power supply but
with an energy harvesting unit and rechargeable energy storage;
it can thus harvest energy from the radio frequency (RF) signals
transmitted by the source, accumulate the energy in its battery,
and then use this energy to perform cooperative jamming. In
the proposed AnJ protocol, based on the energy status of the
jammer and the channel state of source-destination link, the
system operates in either dedicated energy harvesting (DEH) or
opportunistic energy harvesting (OEH) mode. In DEH mode, the
source sends dedicated energy-bearing signals and the jammer
performs energy harvesting. In OEH mode, the source transmits
an information-bearing signal to the destination. Meanwhile, us-
ing the harvested energy, the wireless-powered jammer transmits
a jamming signal to confound the eavesdropper. Thanks to the FD
capability, the jammer also harvests energy from the information-
bearing signal that it overhears from the source. We study the
complex energy accumulation and consumption procedure at the
jammer by considering a practical finite-capacity energy storage,
of which the long-term stationary distribution is characterized
through applying a discrete-state Markov Chain. An alternative
energy storage with infinite capacity is also studied to serve
as an upper bound. We further derive closed-form expressions
for two secrecy metrics, i.e., secrecy outage probability and
probability of positive secrecy capacity. In addition, the impact of
imperfect channel state information on the performance of our
proposed protocol is also investigated. Numerical results validate
all theoretical analyses and reveal the merits of the proposed AnJ
protocol over its half-duplex counterpart.
Index Terms—Cooperative jamming, full-duplex, imperfect
channel state information, physical layer security, wireless energy
harvesting.
I. INTRODUCTION
The steady increase and the ubiquity of wireless communi-
cations have necessitated an unprecedented awareness of the
importance of network security. Unlike the conventional cryp-
tography techniques implemented at higher layers, the physical
layer security deals with the properties of physical channels,
especially interference and fading, to further strengthen the
security of wireless communication systems. Wyner, in his
seminal work [1], pioneered the research on physical layer
security by pointing out that perfect secrecy can be achieved
when the source-eavesdropper channel (i.e. the wiretap chan-
nel) is a degraded version of the source-destination channel
(i.e. the main channel). Since then, numerous studies attempt
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to confound eavesdropping from either the perspective of
information theory (see [2] and references therein) or signal
processing (see [3] for a literature survey).
Artificial noise is one very appealing signal processing
approach towards enhanced secrecy [4]. In [5], a transmitter
equipped with multiple antennas is employed to simultane-
ously transmit information signal to the intended receiver
and artificial noise to eavesdroppers. The artificial noise is
specifically designed to lie in the null space of the main
channel, therefore, only the wiretap channel suffers inter-
ference. However, this approach becomes inapplicable when
the information transmitter has single antenna. To resolve
this issue, the concept of cooperative jamming (CJ) was
proposed to imitate the effects of multiple transmit antennas;
single/multiple helper nodes (now commonly referred to as
jammers) work cooperatively with the information transmitter
and generate artificial noise to confound the eavesdropper. The
design and evaluation of CJ schemes for different network
setups have attracted a wide range of research interests during
the past several years (see [6]–[8] for point-to-point wiretap
channels, and [9]–[13] for relay wiretap channels).
On the other hand, energy deficiency remains to be the
bottleneck in the development of ubiquitous wireless com-
munications. Traditionally, this problem is mainly tackled by
periodic battery replacement or recharging via gaining energy
from various natural energy sources such as solar, wind, and
thermal energy. These conventional solutions, however, are
restricted by low feasibility and controllability; the battery
replacement, in many cases, is often inconvenient (e.g., for
a large number of sensors scattered over a wide area) and
infeasible (e.g., for sensors implanted inside human bodies).
In addition, harvesting energy from natural energy sources is
usually climate dependent and thus tends to be intermittent.
Recently, wireless energy harvesting (WEH) techniques have
drawn much attention as a viable solution to extend the
longevity of energy-constrained wireless networks [14]–[18].
With the WEH technique, wireless communication devices are
able to aquire energy from ambient radio frequency (RF) sig-
nals, which warrants a new research area of wireless powered
CJ.
In wireless powered CJ schemes, jammers obtain energy
from the information source and then use the acquired en-
ergy to perform CJ. The effectiveness of a wireless-powered
jammer largely depends on its harvested energy. In fact, the
intensity of the jamming signal may be brought down to the
noise floor if the transmit power is low, whereas a jammer
working at a high transmission power needs to reduce its
jamming frequency because of the relatively longer charging
period. Although finding an optimal jamming power may be
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2one of the compromise solutions to deal with this trade-
off, maximizing the energy acquisition is believed to be the
approach to solve the problem completely. Of our knowledge,
all available studies on CJ with wireless energy harvesting
have assumed the jamming nodes to be half-duplex (HD),
without investigating the full-duplex (FD) scenarios. In this
work, we propose and examine the use of a wireless-powered
FD jammer for confounding passive eavesdropping. It mainly
brings two merits over its HD counterpart: Firstly, signals
sent by the source can always be received by the jammer
for scavenging energy, even when the jammer is sending
jamming signals. Secondly, the jamming signal can also act as
a potential energy source in addition to its original purpose of
confusing the eavesdropper. As a consequence, the FD jammer
can accumulate more energy and perform more effective
jamming than its HD counterpart in the long run. The main
contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
• Protocol design: This paper explores the use of a
wireless-powered FD jammer to secure the communica-
tion between a source-destination pair, in the presence
of a passive eavesdropper. We consider a time-switched
communication protocol with fixed-rate transmission and
propose an accumulate-and-jam (AnJ) protocol consisting
of dedicated energy harvesting (DEH) and opportunistic
energy harvesting (OEH) modes. In DEH mode, the
source transfers wireless power to the jammer. In OEH
mode, the source sends an information signal to the
destination. Being a wireless-powered node, the jammer
harvests energy from the RF signals sent by the source,
which include the dedicated signal sent to the jammer
in DEH mode and the overheard signal sent from the
source to the destination in OEH mode. In this way, the
benefits of the FD capability are fully exploited to achieve
the maximal amount of harvested energy at the jammer.
Using the acquired energy, the jammer transmits jamming
signals to confound the eavesdropper.
• Imperfect channel state information (CSI): The jamming
signals sent by the jammer (i.e., artificial noise) are
normally designed to lie in the null space of the jammer-
destination channel. To accommodate practical limita-
tions of the latest channel estimation techniques, we
extend the nulling jamming to allow imperfect CSI at the
jammer. Depending on the estimation error factor, this
may lead to minor or moderate interference leakage at
the destination. Its impact on secrecy performance will
be shown via numerical results.
• Finite capacity energy storage: We have also examined
a practical energy storage model with finite capacity at
the jammer. Due to the FD mode, the energy storage will
experience charging and discharging at the same time.
Since a single energy storage is incapable of accommo-
dating this requirement, we adopt a hybrid energy storage
system, consisting of one primary energy storage (PES,
i.e. a chemical rechargeable battery with high energy
density) and one secondary energy storage (SES, i.e. a
super-capacitor with high power density), to solve this
problem. This hybrid energy storage system is able to
be charged and discharged simultaneously. To analyze
such a complex procedure, we have applied an energy
discretization method and a discrete-state Markov Chain
to model the energy state transitions. In addition, energy
dissipation caused by, e.g., signal processing and circuitry
operation, are also taken into account. Furthermore, an
alternative energy storage system with infinite capacity is
also studied to serve as a performance upper bound.
• Performance evaluation: Closed-form expressions for two
important metrics, i.e., the secrecy outage probability, and
the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity, are derived
to evaluate the secrecy performance of our proposed
protocol. The secrecy metrics of the wireless-powered
HD jammer are also analyzed to provide a benchmark.
Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed AnJ
protocol substantially outperforms its HD counterpart.
Furthermore, design insights regarding the impacts of
different system parameters, such as the energy storage
capacity, the imperfect CSI, and the antenna allocation at
the jammer, are also investigated via numerical results.
Relation to Literature: There are three prior studies relevant
to our current work [19]–[21]. In [19], the problem of max-
imizing the secrecy throughput with the aid of a wireless-
powered HD jammer was analyzed, with the assumptions that
the CSI is perfect, the eavesdropper is noiseless, and the
capacity of the jammer’s energy storage is infinite. Although
our network setup has some similarities with the one used in
[19] in terms of applying a wireless-powered multi-antenna
jammer to confound the eavesdropper, the research problem
formulation and solutions in our study are essentially different
from [19]. Particularly, the jammer considered in this study
operates in FD mode, which leads to mixed operations of
energy harvesting and jamming transmission. Moreover, the
imperfect CSI, the non-zero receiver noise at the eavesdropper,
and the finite energy storage capacity, are also included in
our model. In this regard, this work studies the wireless-
powered CJ problem with more practical settings than [19]. In
another study of wireless-powered CJ [20], multiple wireless-
powered jammers were deployed to secure a two-hop amplify-
and-forward relay network. Based on the availability or lack
of the eavesdropper’s CSI at the transmitter, the upper or
lower bounds of the achievable secrecy rate were derived.
Nonetheless, the associated energy accumulation process at
the jammers was not addressed in [20]. In [21], the transmis-
sion outage probability of a wireless-powered relay network
was studied. Inspired by the discretized relay battery model
proposed in [21], we also adopt energy discretization and a
finite-state MC to model the energy evolvement at the jammer.
In addition to the apparently distinct network setup, in order
to fulfill the FD operation mode, the jammer studied in this
work is equipped with a hybrid energy storage system with
the capability of concurrent charging/discharging, whereas the
relay in [21] is equipped with a single rechargeable battery
which can be in the status of either charging or discharging but
not at the same time. As a result, the state transition analysis
of the formulated MC in this work is more sophisticated and
significantly different from that in [21]. Furthermore, it is also
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Fig. 1: System model with illustration of the DEH and OEH
operation mode.
noteworthy that a hybrid energy storage system with infinite
capacity is also studied in this work to reveal the performance
difference between the discretized and the continuous models.
Organization: Section II describes the system model and
the proposed AnJ protocol. Section III presents the energy
discretization method and the discrete-state Markov Chain for
modeling the change of energy status at the jammer during the
communication. Closed-form expressions for secrecy outage
probability and the existence of non-zero secrecy capacity
are derived in Section IV. For comparison purposes, two
alternative schemes, one with a wireless powered FD jammer
with infinite energy storage capacity, the other with a wireless
powered HD jammer, are investigated in Section V and VI,
respectively. After presenting numerical results in Section VII,
Section VIII concludes this paper.
Notation: Upper case and lower case bold symbols denote
matrices and vectors, respectively. Superscripts T and † repre-
sent transposition and conjugate transposition. Tr(A) stands
for the trace of the matrix A. |a| is the absolute value of
the complex number a. ||a|| =
√
a†a indicates Euclidean
norm of the vector a. In is the identity matrix of order n.
Cm×n denotes the set of all m×n complex vectors, and E{·}
represents the expectation operator.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROPOSED PROTOCOL
We consider a point-to-point Gaussian wiretap channel
which consists of a source (S), a destination (D), and an
eavesdropper (E). Each of these three wireless agents, either
being a handset or sensor, is equipped with a single antenna, as
illustrated in Fig. 1. In line with the vast majority of previous
studies, the eavesdropper in this work is considered to be a
passive adversary, i.e., it may not transmit but only listens. As
such, the instantaneous CSI of E are unknown by any other
nodes in the network1. Moreover, the passive eavesdropping
makes the source (S) impossible to determine whether the
main channel (S → D) is superior to the wiretap channel (S
→ E).
1But we assume that the channel distribution of the eavesdropper is
available. This assumption has been widely adopted in the literature for
secrecy performance analysis [6], [19].
A. Jammer Model
The jammer is assumed to be an energy-constrained node
without embedded energy source. It thus needs to acquire
energy from ambient RF signals to function. Specifically, when
performing cooperative jamming, J operates in FD mode: it
uses Nr (i.e., Nr ≥ 1) antennas to harvest energy from S,
and Nt (i.e., Nt ≥ 2) antennas to transmit jamming signals,
simultaneously. When cooperative jamming is not carried out,
J focuses on energy harvesting with all its antennas, i.e.,
NJ = Nt +Nr antennas, to receive RF signals. By doing so,
J can maximize its energy acquisition by leaving no antennas
idle. To enable the aforementioned functionality, J is also
equipped with the following components2:
• NJ RF chains for energy harvesting and jamming trans-
mission,
• NJ rectifiers for rectifying the received RF signals into
direct currents (DC) [22],
• a primary energy storage (PES), i.e. a chemical recharge-
able battery with high energy density,
• a secondary energy storage (SES), i.e. a super-capacitor
with high power density.
Specifically, Nr out of the NJ antennas are connected perma-
nently to Nr rectifiers. The rest ones, i.e., Nt = NJ −Nr, are
connected to the remaining Nt rectifiers in a non-permanent
manner. For simplicity, we consider this antenna allocation
as predetermined, and the potential antenna selection problem
is beyond the scope of this work. The reason for employing
the hybrid energy storage system at J is that a single energy
storage cannot be charged and discharged at the same time, and
therefore cannot support the FD operation. Briefly, PES is di-
rectly connected to the rectifiers and the RF chains. When the
RF chains are idle, the harvested energy is delivered straight
into PES. During transmission, PES uses its stored energy to
power up the RF chains. Meanwhile, the harvested energy
is temporarily saved in SES. Once the jamming transmission
finishes, SES transfers all its stored energy to PES.
It is also important to clarify that the FD technique applied
at J is for simultaneous energy reception and information
transmission, which does not strictly fall into the category
of conventional FD communications. With a slightly abused
terminology, we refer such a jammer as a wireless-powered
FD node3. In addition, for the comparison purpose, we also
consider the usage of a wireless-powered HD jammer, which
performs either energy harvesting or jamming transmission,
but not at the same time. More details are given in Section
VI.
B. Channel Assumptions
In Fig. 1, fading channel coefficients of the links S → J,
S → D, S → E, J → D, and J → E are denoted by hSJ ,
hSD, hSE , hJD, and hJE , respectively. We assume a quasi-
static flat fading channel model, in which these fading channel
2Note that at the current stage of research, the optimal structure of an RF
energy harvesting node is not completely known. The proposed circuit model
in this paper provides only one possible practical design.
3It is also worth noting that such unconventional usage of the term full-
duplex is not uncommon in existing literature [23]–[25].
4coefficients remain constant within each transmission block
of duration T 4, and vary independently from one block to
another. We apply different small-scale fading models to the
channel hSJ that performs energy harvesting and the other
channels that perform information transmission. Specifically,
since the up-to-date wireless energy harvesting techniques will
only work within a relatively short distance, a line-of-sight
(LoS) path is likely to present between S and J. Therefore, fol-
lowing [26], [27], we model hSJ as a Rician fading channel.
Through adjusting the Rician factor K, different channels can
be modeled, ranging from a fully deterministic LoS channel
(i.e. for short distance) to a weakly dominated LoS channel
(i.e. for relatively large distance). On the other hand, for all
other channels performing information transmission, we apply
an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Rayleigh
fading to model the heavily scattered wireless communication.
In this paper, we also make the following assumptions
regarding the CSI: hSD and hJD are acquired respectively
by S and J via channel estimation, but the estimated hJD
at J is imperfect. The CSI of the eavesdropper, i.e., hSE
and hJE , is known only to itself as a result of passive
eavesdropping. The rationality and advantages of considering
imperfect hJD at J are two-fold: 1) As an energy-constrained
node, the jammer has limited processing power and capability
to perform accurate channel estimation, and 2) With imperfect
hJD, we have extended the nulling jamming scheme to allow
for interference leakage at the destination. We, therefore, are
able to evaluate the impact of imperfect CSI on the system
performance. Finally, channel reciprocity is assumed for all
the wireless links in the considered system.
C. Protocol Description
In the proposed AnJ protocol, at the beginning of the kth
transmission block (k = 1, 2, . . . ), J estimates its residual
energy ε[k] and compares it with a predefined threshold Eth.
In the case of ε[k] ≥ Eth or ε[k] < Eth, J broadcasts a single
bit (i.e. 1 or 0) to inform S and D whether it is capable of CJ,
with bit 0 indicating that the energy at J is not sufficient for
CJ, and bit 1 otherwise. If bit 0 is received from J, S feeds
back bit 0 to J and D via a feedback channel to indicate that
the current block will operate in DEH mode, and thus D keeps
silent during this block. Otherwise (i.e. S and D receives bit
1 from J), S keeps listening, and D sends a pilot signal for S
and J to perform channel estimation. With the assumed channel
reciprocity, S can estimate hSD which is then used to verify
whether the instantaneous channel capacity CSD, expressed
as,
CSD , log2
(
1 +
PSHSD
σ2D
)
(1)
can support a secrecy rate Rs. In (1), PS is the source
transmitting power, HSD , |hSD|2, and σ2D is the additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at D. When CSD ≥ Rs, S
feeds back bit 1 to D and J to indicate that the current block
will operate in OEH mode. Otherwise (i.e. CSD < Rs),
4Without loss of generality, we normalize the block duration to one time
unit, i.e., T = 1. As a consequence, the measures of energy and power
become identical in this paper and therefore can be used interchangeably.
S feeds back bit 0 to indicate that the DEH mode will
be activated. The signaling message exchange among S, D,
and J then terminates here. Let Φ[k] ∈ {Φd,Φo} indicate
the operation mode (i.e., either DEH or OEH) for the kth
transmission block, we have
Φ[k] =
{
Φo, if ε[k] ≥ Eth and CSD ≥ Rs,
Φd, otherwise.
(2)
The condition of ε[k] > Eth is referred to as the “energy
condition”. It is used to prevent the intensity of the jamming
signal from dropping down to the noise level at E, which
wastes the acquired energy at J. The condition of CSD > Rs is
referred to as the “channel condition”. The system will suffer
from secrecy outage if the channel condition is not met. The
necessity of the channel condition will be shown clearly in
Section IV where the secrecy outage is defined.
In the following, we present the details of the signal
processing occurred in each mode.
1) In DEH Mode: With a fixed transmitting power PS , S
sends J an energy-bearing signal, which is randomly generated
and contains no secret information. To maximize the acquired
energy, J employs all the NJ antennas for receiving RF signals.
By ignoring the negligible energy harvested from the receiver
noise, the total amount of energy harvested at J during a DEH
block is given by [20]
Edh = ηPSH
d
SJ , (3)
where HdSJ ,
∥∥hdSJ∥∥2 ,hdSJ ∈ CNJ×1, and η denotes the
energy conversion efficiency. The harvested energy is delivered
straight into PES.
2) In OEH Mode: With the same transmitting power
PS , S sends an information-bearing signal xS to D, with
E{|xS |2} = 1. J sends a jamming signal xJ , which is
deliberately designed for the purpose of producing a null at
D and degrading the wiretap channel of E. It is clear that
only when J is equipped with Nt ≥ 2 antennas there are
enough degrees of freedom to design xJ . Specifically, the
artificial noise generation method proposed in [4] is adopted,
which requires instantaneous CSI hJD for beam design5.
Unfortunately, as an energy-constrained node, the processing
capability of the jammer is limited. Therefore, there is a certain
degree of mismatch between the estimated CSI hˆJD and the
real CSI hJD, of which relation can be expressed as [30], [31]
hJD =
√
ρ hˆJD +
√
1− ρ herr (4)
where herr is the error noise vector with i.i.d. zero mean
and variance σ2err. ρ, scaling from 0 to 1, is the correlation
coefficient between hˆJD and hJD. A larger ρ means better
CSI accuracy. If ρ = 1, J has full CSI hJD.
As mentioned earlier, the imperfect estimate hˆJD is used
to design the jamming signal xJ . Specifically, xJ = Wv,
where W is a Nt × (Nt − 1) matrix constructed in the null-
space of hˆJD, and v is the artificial noise vector with Nt− 1
elements. Each element of v is assumed to be an i.i.d. complex
5The jammer may estimate hJD via channel training methods designed
specifically for wireless-powered networks, e.g., [28], [29].
5Gaussian random variable with zero mean and normalized
variance. Thus, the received signal at D and E are given by
yD =
√
PShSDxS +
√
(1− ρ)PJh†err
Wv√
Nt − 1
+ nD (5)
and
yE =
√
PShSExS +
√
PJh
†
JE
Wv√
Nt − 1
+ nE , (6)
respectively, where PJ is the transmitting power of J (i.e.,
0 < PJ < Eth). nD and nE denote the AWGN with zero mean
and variance σ2D and σ
2
E , respectively. It can be seen from (5)
that the jamming signal also leaks into D’s receiver due to
the estimation error. We show later at the numerical results in
Section VII the impact of ρ on the protocol performance.
Apart from information transmission and reception, wireless
energy harvesting continues in OEH mode. Specifically, the
received signal at J is given by
yJ =
√
PSh
o
SJxS +
√
PJH`
Wv√
Nt − 1
+ nJ (7)
where H` ∈ CNr×Nt denotes the loop channel at J, nJ is the
Nr × 1 AWGN vector satisfying E[nJn†J ] = INrσ2J , and σ2J
is the noise variance at each receiving antenna.
From (7), the energy-harvesting circuitry of J not only
harvests energy from the signal that it overhears from S, but
also recycles a portion of its own transmitted energy. However,
to the best of our knowledge, the distribution of the loop
channel H` before applying any interference cancellation is
still unknown in open literature. As a result, it is extremely
difficult to derive the statistical functions for the recycled
energy term. To make the ensuing mathematical analysis
tractable and to attain meaningful results, we have to omit the
recycled energy term in the following theoretical derivations.
In this case, the total amount of harvested energy in OEH
mode is expressed as
Eoh ≈ ηPSHoSJ (8)
where HoSJ , ‖hoSJ‖2 ,hoSJ ∈ CNr×1. Similar to (3), the
harvested noise power is also ignored in (8). The harvested
energy is first saved at SES and then delivered to PES once
the jamming transmission finishes. It is noteworthy that due to
the omission of recycled energy, strictly speaking, the ensuing
theoretical analysis in this paper draws a lower bound for the
secrecy performance of the proposed AnJ protocol.
III. MARKOV CHAIN OF JAMMER ENERGY STORAGE
The purpose of studying the jammer’s energy storage is to
find out the probability that the energy condition is met. Due
to the FD operation mode, the energy status at J exhibits a
complex charging and discharging behavior. We tackle this
problem by first applying energy discretization at PES, then
using a finite-state Markov Chain (MC) to model the state
transition between discrete energy levels.
A. Energy Discretization
As we consider a practical energy storage with finite capac-
ity, the analyses designed for infinite battery capacity [19] are
not applicable to the current study. We, therefore, follow [21]
and apply a discrete-level battery model to characterize the
dynamic behaviors of PES and SES. Specifically, we discretize
PES into L + 1 energy levels, with the i-th level expressed
as εi , iC1/L, i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L}, where C1 represents the
capacity of PES and is assumed to be greater than Eth (i.e.,
otherwise the jammer can never transmit).
Specifically, in DEH mode, the discretized energy saved in
PES can be expressed as
εdh , εidh , where i
d
h = arg max
i∈{0,1,...,L}
{εi : εi ≤ Edh}. (9)
It is worth pointing out that if Edh > C1, energy will overflow
because the maximum amount of energy that can be saved
in PES is C1. Eq. (9) implies εdh ≤ εL = C1 by limiting
i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L}. As for the OEH mode, since the acquired
energy Eoh is first saved in SES and then transferred to PES,
considering energy overflow at SES, the amount of energy
exported by SES is equal to min{Eoh, C2}. After transferring
along the circuitry from SES to PES, the amount of energy
imported to PES can be expressed as
E˜oh = η
′ ×min{Eoh, C2} (10)
where η′ is the energy transfer efficiency from SES to PES
[32], and min{x, y} gives the smaller value between x and y.
After discretization, the amount of energy eventually saved in
PES is given by
εoh , εioh , where i
o
h = arg max
i∈{0,1,...,L}
{εi : εi ≤ E˜oh}. (11)
On the other hand, the required energy for jamming transmis-
sion Eth corresponds to a discrete energy level εt, which is
defined as
εt , εit , where it = arg min
i∈{0,1,...,L}
{εi : εi ≥ Eth}. (12)
Note that Eth entails all energy consumption occurred at J,
i.e., Eth = PJ + Pc, where Pc denotes the constant circuitry
power [33]. Furthermore, (12) can also be expressed as
εt =
⌈
Eth
C1/L
⌉
C1
L
=
τ
L
C1, (13)
where d·e stands for the ceiling function, and τ ,
⌈
Eth
C1/L
⌉
is
defined for notation simplicity.
At the beginning of the [k + 1]th transmission block,
the residual energy ε[k + 1] is determined by the operation
mode Φ[k] and the residual energy ε[k] from the kth block.
Therefore,
ε[k + 1] =
{
min{ε[k]− εt + εoh, C1} if Φ[k] = Φo,
min{ε[k] + εdh, C1} if Φ[k] = Φd.
(14)
It is worth noting that the discrete energy model can tightly
approximate its continuous counterpart when the number of
the discretization level is sufficiently large [34] (L→∞ cor-
responds to a continuous energy storage model). The impact
of L on the secrecy performance of the proposed protocol is
presented in Section VII.
6B. Markov Chain
With the energy discretization described above, we are able
to model the transition of the PES energy states as a finite-
state Markov Chain (MC)6. We define state Si as the residual
energy of PES ε[k] being εi. The transition probability pi,j
represents the probability of a transition from state Si to state
Sj . The transitions of the PES energy states have the following
six cases:
1) PES remains empty (S0 → S0): In this case, the
energy condition cannot be met. Therefore, the DEH mode is
activated. Provided that PES remains empty after recharging,
it indicates that the harvested energy during this DEH block is
discretized to zero, i.e., εdh = ε0 = 0. From the definition given
in (3) and (9), the condition of Edh = ηPSHSJ < ε1 = C1/L
must remain if the harvested energy is discretized to zero. The
transition probability p0,0 is thus described as
p0,0 = Pr
{
εdh = 0
}
= Pr
{
Edh < ε1
}
= Pr
{
HdSJ <
1
ηPSL/C1
}
(15)
Since the channel between S and J is assumed to be Rician
fading, the CDF of HdSJ is given by [35]
FHdSJ (x) = 1−QNJ
√2NJK,
√
2(K + 1)
ΩSJ
x
 , (16)
where QNJ (·, ·) is the generalized (NJ -th order) Macum Q-
function [36], and K is the rician factor. Combining (16) with
(15), we have
p0,0 = FHdSJ
(
1
ηPSL/C1
)
(17)
2) PES remains full (SL → SL): In this case, the energy
condition is certainly met. The selection of the operation mode
thus depends purely on the channel condition. If CSD ≥ Rs,
OEH is invoked, where the consumed energy εt is no larger
than the harvested energy εoh. Otherwise (i.e. CSD < Rs),
DEH is invoked, and the harvested energy εdh can be any
arbitrary value as PES is full and cannot accept more energy.
The corresponding transition probability is calculated as
pL,L = Pr {CSD ≥ Rs}Pr {εoh ≥ εt}
+ Pr {CSD < Rs} (18)
We first evaluate qc, i.e. the probability of the channel condi-
tion being satisfied. After performing some simple manipula-
tions, we have
qc = Pr {CSD ≥ Rs} = Pr
{
HSD ≥ 2
Rs − 1
PS/σ2D
}
(19)
Since the channel hSD is assumed to be Rayleigh fading, HSD
follows an exponential distribution with CDF
FHSD (x) = 1− exp
(
− x
ΩSD
)
(20)
6Note that it is not necessary to model the state transition of the SES since
it is used only for temporary energy storage in OEH mode.
Consequently, the probability for the channel condition is
given by
qc = 1− FHSD
(
2Rs − 1
PS/σ2D
)
(21)
and
Pr {CSD < Rs} = 1− qc = FHSD
(
2Rs − 1
PS/σ2D
)
(22)
We now analyze the term Pr {εoh ≥ εt}. From the definition
given in (10), we have
Pr {εoh ≥ εt} = Pr {(η′Eoh ≥ εt) ∩ (Eoh < C2)}
+ Pr {(η′C2 ≥ εt) ∩ (Eoh ≥ C2)}
=
{
Pr{η′Eoh ≥ εt} if C2 ≥ τη′LC1
0 otherwise
(23)
With the definition of Eoh given in (8), we can obtain
Pr{η′Eoh ≥ εt} = Pr
{
HoSJ ≥
τ
ηη′PSL/C1
}
(24)
Similar to (16), the CDF of HoSJ is
FHoSJ (x) = 1−QNr
√2NrK,
√
2(K + 1)
ΩSJ
x
 (25)
Consequently,
Pr{η′Eoh ≥ εt} = 1− FHoSJ
(
τ
ηη′PSL/C1
)
(26)
By combining (21), (22), (23), and (26), we can obtain the
transition probability pL,L as
pL,L =
qc
(
1− FHoSJ
(
τ
ηη′PSL/C1
))
if C2 ≥ τη′LC1
FHSD
(
2Rs−1
PS/σ2D
)
otherwise
(27)
3) The non-empty and non-full PES remains unchangeable
(Si → Si : 0 < i < L): In this transition case, we need to first
evaluate the energy condition. If the available energy is less
than the required energy threshold, i.e., εi < εt, DEH mode
is invoked. If εi ≥ εt, then the energy condition is met. Next,
we need to evaluate the channel condition. In the case that the
channel condition is not satisfied, i.e., CSD < RS , again DEH
mode is selected. Similar to the first transition probability (i.e.,
S0 → S0) , the unchangeable state transition in DEH mode
indicates that the harvested energy is discretized to zero, i.e.,
εdh = 0. On the other hand, if εi ≥ εt and CSD ≥ RS are both
satisfied, OEH is activated. The unchangeable state transition
in OEH mode indicates that the amount of harvested energy
must equal the amount of the consumed energy, i.e., εoh = εt.
The transition probability is thus described as
pi,i = Pr{εi < εt}Pr{εdh = 0}
+ Pr{εi ≥ εt}Pr{CSD < Rs}Pr{εdh = 0}
+ Pr{εi ≥ εt}Pr{CSD ≥ Rs}Pr{εoh = εt}
=

Pr{εdh = 0} if i < τ
Pr{CSD < Rs}Pr{εdh = 0} if i ≥ τ
+ Pr{CSD ≥ Rs}Pr{εoh = εt}
(28)
7From the definition given in (10), we have
Pr{εoh = εt}
= Pr{(0 ≤ η′Eoh − εt < ε1) ∩ (Eoh < C2)}
+ Pr{(0 ≤ η′C2 − εt < ε1) ∩ (Eoh ≥ C2)}
=

0 if C2 < τη′LC1
Pr{η′Eoh ≥ εt} if τη′LC1 ≤ C2 < τ+1η′L C1
Pr{εt ≤ η′Eoh < ε1 + εt} if C2 > τ+1η′L C1
(29)
With some simple manipulations, after combining (15),
(17), (21), (22), (26) and (29), the transition probability pi,i
is given in (30) on the top of the next page.
4) PES is fully charged (Si → SL : 0 ≤ i < L): In this
case, the harvested energy after discretization satisfies εdh ≥
εL− εi in DEH, or εoh− εt ≥ εL− εi in OEH. The transition
probability pi,L is thus described as
pi,L
= Pr{εi < εt}Pr{εdh ≥ εL − εi}
+ Pr{εi ≥ εt}Pr{CSD < Rs}Pr{εdh ≥ εL − εi}
+ Pr{εi ≥ εt}Pr{CSD ≥ Rs}Pr{εoh − εt ≥ εL − εi}
=

Pr{εdh ≥ εL − εi} if i < τ
(1− qc) Pr{εdh ≥ εL − εi} if i ≥ τ
+qc Pr{εoh − εt ≥ εL − εi}
(31)
Particularly, we have
Pr{εdh ≥ εL − εi} = Pr{Edh ≥ C1 − εi} (32)
and
Pr{εoh − εt ≥ εL − εi}
= Pr{(η′Eoh − εt ≥ C1 − εi) ∩ (Eoh < C2)}
+ Pr{(η′C2 − εt ≥ C1 − εi) ∩ (Eoh ≥ C2)}
=
{
0 if C2 < L−i+τη′L C1
Pr{η′Eoh ≥ C1 − εi + εt} if C2 ≥ L−i+τη′L C1
(33)
Consequently, the transition probability in this case is given
by (34).
5) PES is partially charged (Si → Sj : 0 ≤ i < j < L):
This transition case can happen either in DEH mode with εdh =
εj−εi, or in OEH mode with εoh−εt = εj−εi. The transition
probability pi,j is therefore calculated as
pi,j = Pr{εi < εt}Pr{εdh = εj − εi}
+ Pr{εi ≥ εt}Pr{CSD < Rs}Pr{εdh = εj − εi}
+ Pr{εi ≥ εt}Pr{CSD ≥ Rs}Pr{εoh − εt = εj − εi}
=

Pr{εdh = εj − εi} if i < τ
(1− qc) Pr{εdh = εj − εi} if i ≥ τ
+qc Pr{εoh − εt = εj − εi}
(35)
Specifically, we have
Pr{εdh = εj − εi} = Pr{εj − εi ≤ εdh < εj+1 − εi} (36)
and
Pr{εoh − εt = εj − εi}
= Pr{(εj − εi ≤ η′Eoh − εt < εj+1 − εi) ∩ (Eoh < C2)}
+ Pr{(εj − εi ≤ η′C2 − εt < εj+1 − εi) ∩ (Eoh ≥ C2)}
=

0 if C2 < j−i+τη′L C1
Pr{η′Eoh ≥ εj − εi + εt}
if j−i+τη′L C1 ≤ C2 < j−i+τ+1η′L C1
Pr{εj − εi + εt ≤ η′Eoh < εj+1 − εi + εt}
if C2 > j−i+τ+1η′L C1
(37)
Therefore, we can obtain the transition probability in this case
given by (38) shown on top of the page.
6) PES is discharged (Sj → Si : 0 ≤ i < j ≤ L): Since
the stored energy is reduced during this transition case, the
OEH operation mode must have been activated. The amount
of reduced energy, i.e., εj − εi, equals the difference between
the consumed energy εt and the discretized acquired energy
εoh. The transition probability is expressed as
pj,i = Pr{εj ≥ εt}Pr{CSD ≥ Rs}Pr{εt − εoh = εj − εi}
=
{
0 if j < τ
qc Pr{εt − εoh = εj − εi} if j ≥ τ
(39)
And,
Pr{εt − εoh = εj − εi}
= Pr{(εj − εi+1 < εt − η′Eoh ≤ εj − εi) ∩ (Eoh < C2)}
+ Pr{(εj − εi+1 < εt − η′C2 ≤ εj − εi) ∩ (Eoh ≥ C2)}
=

0 if C2 < τ−j+iη′L C1
Pr{η′Eoh ≥ εt − εj + εi}
if τ−j+iη′L C1 ≤ C2 < τ−j+i+1η′L C1
Pr{εt − εj + εi ≤ η′Eoh < εt − εi + εi+1}
if C2 ≥ τ−j+i+1η′L C1
(40)
As a result, the transition probability in this case is given by
(41) on the previous page.
We then examine the stationary distribution ξFD of the PES
energy status, where ξFD,i, i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L} represents the
probability of the residual energy at PES being εi. We first
define MFD , (pi,j) to denote the (L + 1) × (L + 1) state
transition matrix of the MC. By using the similar methods in
[37], we can easily verify that the MC transition matrix MFD
is irreducible and row stochastic. Therefore, there must exist a
unique stationary distribution ξFD that satisfies the following
equation
ξFD = (ξFD,0, ξFD,1, . . . , ξFD,L)
T = (MFD)
T ξFD (42)
8pi,i =

FHdSJ
(
1
ηPSL/C1
)
if i < τ
(1− qc)FHdSJ
(
1
ηPSL/C1
)
if i ≥ τ & C2 < τη′LC1
(1− qc)FHdSJ
(
1
ηPSL/C1
)
+ qc
(
1− FHoSJ
(
τ
ηη′PSL/C1
))
if i ≥ τ & τη′LC1 ≤ C2 < τ+1η′L C1
(1− qc)FHdSJ
(
1
ηPSL/C1
)
+ qc
(
FHoSJ
(
τ+1
ηη′PSL/C1
)
− FHoSJ
(
τ
ηη′PSL/C1
))
if i ≥ τ & C2 ≥ τ+1η′L C1
(30)
pi,L =

1− FHdSJ
(
L−i
ηPSL/C1
)
if i < τ
(1− qc)
(
1− FHdSJ
(
L−i
ηPSL/C1
))
if i ≥ τ & C2 < L−i+τη′L C1
(1− qc)
(
1− FHdSJ
(
L−i
ηPSL/C1
))
+ qc
(
1− FHoSJ
(
L−i+τ
ηη′PSL/C1
))
if i ≥ τ & C2 ≥ L−i+τη′L C1
(34)
pi,j =

FHdSJ
(
j−i+1
ηPSL/C1
)
− FHdSJ
(
j−i
ηPSL/C1
)
if i < τ
(1− qc)
(
FHdSJ
(
j−i+1
ηPSL/C1
)
− FHdSJ
(
j−i
ηPSL/C1
))
if i ≥ τ & C2 < j−i+τη′L C1
(1− qc)
(
FHdSJ
(
j−i+1
ηPSL/C1
)
− FHdSJ
(
j−i
ηPSL/C1
))
if i ≥ τ & j−i+τη′L C1 ≤ C2 < j−i+τ+1η′L C1
+qc
(
1− FHoSJ
(
j−i+τ
ηη′PSL/C1
))
(1− qc)
(
FHdSJ
(
j−i+1
ηPSL/C1
)
− FHdSJ
(
j−i
ηPSL/C1
))
if i ≥ τ & C2 > j−i+τ+1η′L C1
+qc
(
FHoSJ
(
j−i+τ+1
ηη′PSL/C1
)
− FHoSJ
(
j−i+τ
ηη′PSL/C1
))
(38)
pj,i =

0 if j < τ or C2 < τ−j+iη′L C1
qc
(
1− FHoSJ
(
τ−j+i
ηη′PSL/C1
))
if j ≥ τ & τ−j+iη′L C1 ≤ C2 < τ−j+i+1η′L C1
qc
(
FHoSJ
(
τ−j+i+1
ηη′PSL/C1
)
− FHoSJ
(
τ−j+i
ηη′PSL/C1
))
if j ≥ τ & C2 ≥ τ−j+i+1η′L C1
(41)
By solving (42), ξFD can be derived as
ξFD =
(
(MFD)
T − I +B
)−1
b, (43)
where Bi,j = 1,∀i, j and b = (1, 1, . . . , 1)T .
We are now ready to derive the probability that the available
energy at J mets the energy condition. With the stationary
distribution ξFD, we can obtain
Pr {ε[k] ≥ Eth} =
L∑
i=τ
ξFD,i (44)
IV. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we characterize the secrecy performance of
the proposed AnJ protocol in terms of the secrecy outage
probability and the existence of non-zero secrecy capacity.
These two probabilistic metrics are widely used in measuring
secrecy performance when the eavesdropper’s instantaneous
CSI is absent.
A. Preliminaries
The secrecy capacity Cs is defined as the rate difference be-
tween the maximum achievable transmission rate of the main
channel and that of the wiretap channel [1]. Mathematically
speaking,
Cs =
{
CM − CW if γD > γE
0 if γD ≤ γE
(45)
where CM = log2 (1+γD) is the capacity of the main channel
between S and D, and CW = log2 (1 + γE) is the capacity
of the wiretap channel between S and E. In (45), γD and γE
denote the instantaneous SNRs at D and E, respectively.
Specifically, the secrecy outage probability, i.e., PAnJso , is
defined as the probability that the secrecy capacity Cs is less
than a target secrecy rate Rs7 [38]. Mathematically speaking,
PAnJso = Pr{Cs < Rs} (46)
The existence of non-zero secrecy capacity, i.e., PAnJnzsc , is
defined as the probability that the secrecy capacity is greater
than zero, i.e.,
PAnJnzsc = Pr{Cs > 0} (47)
7From (45) and (46), it is clear that secrecy outage must happen if the
channel capacity of link S → D is less than Rs, which motivates our energy
condition presented in Section II-C.
9B. Secrecy Outage Probability
We first derive the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINR) and its corresponding PDF and CDF at D and E,
respectively. From (5), the SINR at D is given by
γD =
PSHSD
(1− ρ)PJσ2err/(Nt − 1) + σ2D
(48)
Since hSD is Rayleigh fading channel, γD follows an expo-
nential distribution.
From (6), the SINR at E is given by
γE =
PS |hSE |2
PJ ||(hJE)†W ||2/(Nt − 1) + σ2E
(49)
The PDF of γE depends on |hSE |2 and ||(hJE)†W ||2. To
proceed, we first define X , PS |hSE |2. Recall that hSE
follows a Rayleigh distribution, we thus have the PDF of X
as
fX(x) =
1
PSΩSE
exp
(
− x
PSΩSE
)
(50)
We also define Y , PJ ||(hJE)
†W ||2
Nt−1 . Since ||(hJE)†||2 is a
sum of i.i.d. exponential distributed random variables, and
W is a unitary matrix, ||(hJE)†W ||2 is also a sum of i.i.d.
exponential distributed random variables [5]. Therefore, Y
follows a Gamma distribution G(Nt − 1, PJΩJE/(Nt − 1))
with the PDF given by
fY (y) =
yNt−2e−
Nt−1
PJΩJE
y
Γ(Nt − 1)
(
PJΩJE
Nt−1
)Nt−1 (51)
According to (49), the expression γE = XY+σ2E
then holds.
Therefore, we can obtain the CDF of γE as
FγE (z) = Pr{γE < z} = Pr
{
X
Y + σ2E
< z
}
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ zy+zσ2E
0
fX(x)fY (y) dx dy
= 1− e−
zσ2E
PSΩSE
(
Nt − 1
ϕz +Nt − 1
)Nt−1
(52)
where ϕ , PJΩJEPSΩSE , and the integral is obtained from [36, Eq.
(3.326.2)]. Correspondingly, the PDF of γE is obtained as
fγE (z) =
σ2E e
− zσ
2
E
PSΩSE
PSΩSE
(
Nt − 1
ϕz +Nt − 1
)Nt−1
+ ϕe
− zσ
2
E
PSΩSE
(
Nt − 1
ϕz +Nt − 1
)Nt
(53)
Proposition 1. The exact secrecy outage probability for the
proposed AnJ protocol is derived as (54) at the top of the
next page, where β1 , (Nt − 1)/ϕ, µ1 , 2Rsκ1ΩSD +
σ2E
PSΩSE
,
κ1 , PS(1−ρ)PJσ2err/(Nt−1)+σ2D , and
Ψ1(n, µ, β) , (n− 1)β−1 − (−µ)n−1eβµEi(−βµ) (55)
Ψ2(n, µ, β) ,
1
(n− 1)!
n−1∑
k=1
(k − 1)!(−µ)n−k−1β−k
− (−µ)
n−1
(n− 1)! e
βµEi(−βµ) (56)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Corollary 1. The probability of non-zero secrecy capacity
is derived as (57) at the top of the next page, where κ2 ,
PS/σ
2
D, β2 = (2
Rs − 1)κ1/κ2, and µ2 , 1κ1ΩSD +
σ2E
PSΩSE
.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 1. For a given source transmit power PS , the probabil-
ity that the accumulated energy at J is sufficient for jamming
decreases with the increase of the jamming power PJ . Specif-
ically, the threshold τ for the last summation term in (54)
increases with PJ . Accordingly, the probability summation∑L
i=τ ξFD,i decreases with the increase of PJ , which has
a negative effect on the secrecy outage. On the other hand,
according to (48) and (49), increasing PJ will reduce the
SINR at both D and E, but to a lesser extent for γD compared
to γE as the null space jamming is designed. Consequently,
larger PJ can lead to larger instantaneous secrecy capacity
Cs, which has a positive effect on the secrecy outage. To
make a long story short, a higher PJ is associated with lower
jamming frequency but higher interference strength. Therefore,
we deduce that there would be an optimal P ∗J that minimizes
PAnJso . This will be verified by numerical results in Section
VII. Unfortunately, due to the complexity of the considered
MC model, it is difficult to find a general closed-form solution
for P ∗J . Nevertheless, for a given network setup, we can readily
obtain P ∗J by performing a one-dimensional exhaustive search
over the finite range of the discretized energy levels.
V. CONTINUOUS ENERGY STORAGE MODEL WITH
INFINITE CAPACITY
In the proposed AnJ protocol, we employ PES and SES
with finite storage capacity at the wireless powered jammer.
It is obvious that the system performance can be improved
via increasing the capacity of PES and SES: A larger capacity
can reduce the energy loss caused by energy overflow, thus the
jammer can accumulate more energy for supporting jamming
transmission. On the other hand, one can infer that the rate of
the performance improvement actually decreases as the energy
storage capacity increases, because energy overflow occurs
more rarely as the capacity keeps increasing. Considering
the device cost and size, a question then comes up: “For
a given network setup, how much energy storage capacity
and the corresponding discretization level are considered as
adequate?” To answer this question, in this subsection, we
analyze the upper bound of the system performance with
infinite energy storage capacity, i.e., C1 →∞, C2 →∞.
To investigate the long-term behavior of the infinite energy
storage, we need to compare the energy consumption Eth with
E{E˜oh}, which is the average amount of energy acquired by
J in OEH mode. Specifically, Eth < E{E˜oh} means that, on
average, the harvested energy in OEH mode can fully meet
the required energy consumption at the jammer. In this case,
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PAnJso =

1−
(
σ2E
PSΩSE
Ψ1(1, µ1, β1) + Ψ1(2, µ1, β1)
)
ϕ−1 exp
(
− 2Rs−1κ1ΩSD
)∑L
i=τ ξFD,i if Nt = 2
1−
(
σ2E
PSΩSE
Ψ2(Nt − 1, µ1, β1) + (Nt − 1)Ψ2(Nt, µ1, β1)
)
βNt−11 exp
(
− 2Rs−1κ1ΩSD
) ∑L
i=τ ξFD,i if Nt ≥ 3
(54)
PAnJnzsc =

(
σ2E
PSΩSE
Ψ1(1, µ2, β1 + β2) + Ψ1(2, µ2, β1 + β2)
)
ϕ−1e−β2µ2
∑L
i=τ ξFD,i if Nt = 2
+ exp
(
− 2Rs−1κ2ΩSD
)
FγE (β2)
∑L
i=τ ξFD,i(
σ2E
PSΩSE
Ψ2(Nt − 1, µ2, β1 + β2) + (Nt − 1)Ψ2(Nt, µ2, β1 + β2)
)
βNt−11 e
−β2µ2 ∑L
i=τ ξFD,i if Nt ≥ 3
+ exp
(
− 2Rs−1κ2ΩSD
)
FγE (β2)
∑L
i=τ ξFD,i
(57)
the energy stored in PES steadily accumulates during the
communication process, which makes the jammer always meet
the energy condition.
On the other hand, when Eth > E{E˜oh}, the harvested
energy in OEH mode is, on average, less than the consumed
energy. As a result, the energy level at PES stays between
zero and Eth. In this case, the total amount of harvested energy
must equal the total amount of energy consumption in the long
run. Mathematically, with qc being the probability of meeting
the channel condition, and qb indicating the probability of
activating the energy condition, we have
qcqbE{E˜oh}+ (1− qcqb)E{Edh} = qcqbEth (58)
⇒ qb = E{E
d
n}
qc
(
Eth + E{Edn} − E{E˜oh}
) (59)
With the CDF of HdSJ in (16), we can calculate E{Edn} as
E{Edn} = ηPSE{HdSJ}
= ηPS
∫ ∞
0
xF ′HdSJ (x) dx = ηPSNJΩSJ (60)
Similarly, with the CDF of HoSJ in (25), we have
E{E˜oh} = ηη′PSE{HoSJ} = ηη′PSNrΩSJ (61)
When combining (60) and (61) with (59), we can obtain qb
as
qb =
ηPSNJΩSJ
qc (Eth + ηPSNJΩSJ − ηη′PSNrΩSJ) (62)
Note that qc is already given in (21).
Corollary 2. The closed-form expression of the secrecy outage
probability for a cooperative jammer with an infinite capacity
energy storage can be obtained by replacing
∑L
i=τ ξFD,i in
(54) with qb.
VI. COOPERATIVE JAMMING BY A WIRELESS-POWERED
HALF-DUPLEX JAMMER
In this subsection, we consider an alternative cooperative
jamming protocol with a wireless-powered HD jammer J’ to
provide a benchmark for evaluating the performance of the
proposed AnJ protocol.
In order to compare our proposed FD jammer and this HD
jammer in a fair manner, we assume that J’ is equipped with
the same number of antennas and rectifiers as J, i.e., NJ RF
antennas and NJ rectifiers. All antennas and rectifiers are
connected in a non-permanent manner. Due to the HD mode,
J’ requires only one energy storage. We let the capacity of the
energy storage at J’ be C1, same as that of the PES at J. It
is noteworthy that the analytical approach in [19] for a HD
jammer is not applicable to J’, because our energy storage
has a finite capacity, while the battery capacity in [19] was
infinite. Similar to J, J’ also operates in two modes, i.e., the
energy harvesting (EH) mode and the cooperative jamming
(CJ) mode. In EH mode, J’ performs exactly like J and harvests
the same amount of energy Edh. All acquired energy is saved in
its single energy storage. In CJ mode, on the contrary, J’ uses
all NJ antennas to transmit jamming signals, and therefore,
does not acquire any energy. Assuming that imperfect channel
estimation also occurs at J’, the corresponding SINR at D and
E are given by
γ′D =
PSHSD
(1− ρ)PJσ2err/(NJ − 1) + σ2D
(70)
and
γ′E =
PS |hSE |2
PJ ||(hJE)†W ||2/(NJ − 1) + σ2E
(71)
Note that (70) and (71) differ from (48) and (49) only in the
number of transmitting antennas, i.e., Nr is replaced with NJ .
Remark 2. Owing to the FD operation mode, it is evident that J
harvests more energy than J’. Yet, how much additional energy
that J can acquire mainly depends on how the antennas at J
are assigned for energy harvesting and jamming transmission.
The impact of antenna allocation on secrecy performance of
the proposed AnJ protocol will be shown in numerical results.
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A. Markov Chain for HD Jammer
We discretize the battery at J’ in the way as described in
Section III-A (i.e., the same discretization as J). Different from
the MC presented in Section III-B, all state transitions at J’
without a decrease in energy levels refer to the EH mode,
because no energy is harvested by J’ in the CJ mode. The
state transition probability of J’, p′i,j , is characterized in the
following six cases. Due to space scarcity, we have skipped
the full details.
1) The battery remains empty (S0 → S0):
p′0,0 = Pr
{
εdh = 0
}
= FHdSJ
(
1
ηPSL/C1
)
(72)
2) The battery remains full (SL → SL):
p′L,L = Pr {CSD < Rs} = 1− qc (73)
3) The non-empty and non-full PES remains unchangeable
(Si → Si : 0 < i < L):
p′i,i = Pr{εi < εt}Pr{εdh = 0}
+ Pr{εi ≥ εt}Pr{CSD < Rs}Pr{εdh = 0}
=
FHdSJ
(
1
ηPSL/C1
)
if i < τ
(1− qc)FHdSJ
(
1
ηPSL/C1
)
if i ≥ τ
(74)
4) PES is partially charged (Si → Sj : 0 ≤ i < j < L):
p′i,j = Pr{εi < εt}Pr{εdh = εj − εi}
+ Pr{εi ≥ εt}Pr{CSD < Rs}Pr{εdh = εj − εi}
=

FHdSJ
(
j−i+1
ηPSL/C1
)
− FHdSJ
(
j−i
ηPSL/C1
)
if i < τ(
FHdSJ
(
j−i+1
ηPSL/C1
)
− FHdSJ
(
j−i
ηPSL/C1
))
if i ≥ τ
×(1− qc)
(75)
5) The battery is fully charged (Si → SL : 0 ≤ i < L):
p′i,L = Pr{εi < εt}Pr{εdh ≥ εL − εi}
+ Pr{εi ≥ εt}Pr{CSD < Rs}Pr{εdh ≥ εL − εi}
=
1− FHdSJ
(
L−i
ηPSL/C1
)
if i < τ
(1− qc)
(
1− FHdSJ
(
L−i
ηPSL/C1
))
if i ≥ τ
(76)
6) The battery is discharged (Sj → Si : 0 ≤ i < j ≤ L):
p′j,i = Pr{εj ≥ εt}Pr{CSD ≥ Rs}Pr{εt = εj − εi}
=
{
qc if i = j − τ
0 otherwise
(77)
Based on the above expressions for p′i,j , we define the
transition matrix of the above MC as MHD , (p′i,j). Similar
as (43), the stationary distribution of the battery at J’ is given
by
ξHD = (M
T
HD − I +B)−1b. (78)
where the i-th entry, ξHD,i, denotes the probability of the
residual energy in the battery of J’ being εi. As a result, the
probability for the energy condition being met at J’ is
Pr {ε[k] ≥ Eth} =
L∑
i=τ
ξHD,i (79)
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Fig. 2: Secrecy outage probability with various C1 and L
versus PS . PJ = 10 dBm
B. Secrecy Performance for HD Jammer
In this subsection, we derive the secrecy performance for
the cooperative jamming scheme with J’. Based on Proposition
1 and Corollary 1, we can obtain the following corollaries.
Corollary 3. The closed-form expression of the secrecy outage
probability for cooperative jamming from J’ can be obtained
by replacing Nt and ξFD,i in (54) with NJ and ξHD,i,
respectively.
Corollary 4. The closed-form expression of the probability of
non-zero secrecy capacity for cooperative jamming from J’ can
be obtained by replacing Nt in (57) with NJ , and replacing
ξFD,i with ξHD,i.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, We provide numerical results based on
the analytical expressions developed in the previous sections,
and investigate the impact of key system parameters on the
performance. In line with [19], the simulation is carried out on
of a linear topology where nodes S, J, E, and D are placed in
order along a horizontal line; the distances are set to dSJ = 5
m, dSE = 20 m and dSD = 30 m. Throughout this section,
unless otherwise stated, we set the path loss exponent α = 3,
the fading channel variances Ωij = 1/(1 + dαij), the noise
power σ2D = −80 dBm, the target secrecy rate Rs = 1, the
Rician factor K = 5 dB, the channel estimation factor ρ = 1,
and the number of antennas at the jammer NJ = 8 (i.e.,
Nr = Nt = 4). For parameters regarding the energy storage,
we set the energy conversion efficiency η = 0.5, the energy
transfer efficiency η′ = 0.9, the PES capacity C1 = 0.02, the
SES capacity C2 = 0.01, the discretization level L = 100,
and the constant circuitry power Pc = 0.1× 10−3 watt8.
8We note that typical values for practical parameters used in EH systems
depend on both the system application and specific technology used for
implementation of RF energy harvesting circuits.
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A. The Validation of Energy Discretization Model
In this subsection, we examine the accuracy of the energy
discretization model (referred to as EDM hereafter, for no-
tation simplicity) presented in Section III. Fig. 2 shows the
secrecy outage probability with different PES capacity values
and discretization levels. The performance of the continuous
energy storage with infinite capacity is also plotted to serve
as an upper bound. In the case of C1 = 0.1, it can be seen
from the figure that the performance of EDM approaches the
upper bound as L increases. Specifically, when L = 400, the
performance of EDM coincides with the upper bound. This is
because a larger L results in a smaller quantization step size,
i.e., C1/L, for a given PES capacity C1. As a result, the energy
loss caused by the discretization process reduces. On the other
hand, when C1 = 0.02, it is observed that the performance of
EDM converges to the upper bound much more rapidly than
the case of C1 = 0.1. In particular, even a small discretization
level of L = 50 suffices the close match. This is because given
a small C1, a small value of L is adequate to provide the same
discretization granularity. This observation allows the system
designer to reduce computation via choosing a small L, when
the energy storage capacity is low. Besides, when PS exceeds
25 dBm, the performance of EDM deviates from the upper
bound, which indicates that energy overflow occurs frequently,
and the selected storage capacity should be enlarged.
B. The Effect of the Number of Jammer Antennas and Rician
Factor
In this subsection, we investigate the effects of the number
of antennas at the jammer (i.e., NJ ) and the Rician factor (i.e.,
K) on the secrecy performance. In Fig. 3, the solid lines are
for K = 5 dB (i.e., Rician fading), whereas the dashed lines
are for K = −∞ dB (i.e., Rayleigh fading). The performance
differences between these two are surprisingly minor, which
indicates that the strength of the LoS path between S and J has
limited impact on the system performance. On the contrary,
the effect of NJ is remarkable: As NJ increases from 4 to
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Fig. 4: The existence of non-zero secrecy capacity with various
NJ and K versus PS . PJ = 0 dBm
8, the secrecy outage decreases significantly. In addition, the
increase of PS also improves the performance notably. The
positive association of NJ and PS with system performance
is because greater NJ and/or PS can increase the amount of
harvested energy at the jammer, and therefore can support
more frequent jamming. The finding suggests that increasing
the number of antennas at the jammer and/or increasing the
transmitting power at the source are two effective manners for
secrecy improvement. Monte Carlo simulation results are also
provided in Fig. 3 to validate the closed-form expressions in
Eq. (54). In addition, similar positive effects of NJ and K on
the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity can be observed
in Fig. 4. Monte Carlo simulation results presented in Fig. 4
are in line with the closed-form expressions in Eq. (57).
C. The Effect of the Jamming Power
Fig. 5 shows the association between the secrecy outage
probability and the jamming power PJ . The source transmit-
ting power is chosen from PS = [20, 25, 30] dBm. Overall,
it can be seen that a distinct optimum jamming power P ∗J
with the minimum secrecy outage probability, exists in all
considered scenarios. The existence of P ∗J is because, in short,
a higher PJ is associated with lower jamming frequency
but higher interference strength. This finding validates our
deduction in Remark 1. It also implies that in a scenario
with multiple jammers, the jamming power at each jammer
should be individually optimized. In addition, as expected,
the optimum jamming power of the proposed FD scheme is
notably higher than that of HD.
D. The Performance Comparison Between FD Jamming and
HD Jamming
In this subsection, we compare the optimum secrecy perfor-
mance between the FD and the HD scheme. Fig. 6 illustrates
the secrecy outage probability for the two schemes with
various secrecy rate Rs. The jamming power for both FD and
HD is chosen to be the corresponding optimum value, i.e.,
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Fig. 6: Comparison of the optimum secrecy outage probability
of FD and HD, PJ = P ∗J
PJ = P
∗
J . It is clear from the figure that the proposed FD
scheme achieves significantly lower secrecy outage than the
HD scheme over the entire range of PS . Specifically, when
Rs reduces from 1 to 0.1, the reduction in secrecy outage for
the FD scheme is more notable than that for the HD scheme,
suggesting that reducing Rs as a method to mitigate the outage
is more effective in the FD scheme than in the HD scheme.
Moreover, the performance gap between the two schemes can
be further enlarged by rearranging the antenna allocation at the
FD jammer, which will be discussed in the next subsection.
E. The Effect of Antenna Allocation at the Jammer
In this subsection, we investigate the impact of antenna
allocation at the jammer on system performance. Fig. 7 shows
the secrecy outage probability of the proposed protocol with
different transmitting/receiving antenna allocations. When PS
increases from 10 dBm to 15 dBm, the allocation of Nt =
2, Nr = 6 achieves the smallest secrecy outage; after 15
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Fig. 7: Secrecy outage probability with various antenna allo-
cation at the jammer, PJ = P ∗J .
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Fig. 8: Secrecy outage probability with various ρ versus PS ,
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J .
dBm, equal allocation of Nt = 4, Nr = 4 overtakes until PS
increases to 35 dBm. In the high transmitting power regime,
the allocation of Nt = 6, Nr = 2 finally catches up. The
finding suggests that in the cases that the source is sending
with low transmitting power, more antennas should be used for
energy harvesting, whereas in the paradigm where the source is
sending with high transmitting power, more antennas should be
used for cooperative jamming, as fewer antennas are required
to receive sufficient energy.
F. The Effect of Channel Estimation Error
In this subsection, we investigate the impact of ρ on the se-
crecy outage probability of the proposed protocol. From Fig. 8,
as expected, the CSI mismatch indeed results in performance
loss. Specifically, the performance loss is dramatic when
slightly reducing ρ from 1 to 0.9. The finding indicates that the
system performance in practice can be severely degraded by
imperfect CSI. Therefore, developing advanced CSI estimation
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technique dedicatedly for wireless-powered communication
network is critical for physical layer security.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates and discusses 1) the dynamic charg-
ing/discharging behavior of the finite capacity energy storage
at the jammer, and 2) the secrecy outage probability and the
existence of the non-zero secrecy capacity of the proposed
AnJ protocol. For the former one, we applied energy dis-
cretization model and Markov Chain to derive its stationary
distribution over the long term. For the latter one, we took
into account the imperfect CSI at the jammer. Additionally,
we investigated an infinite capacity energy storage to reveal
the performance upper bound. We also derived the secrecy
metrics of a wireless-powered half-duplex jammer to serves
as a performance benchmark. Numerical results demonstrate
that our proposed protocol can provide not only a superior
performance over the conventional half-duplex schemes, but
also a satisfactory performance close to the upper bound when
the energy storage is sufficiently subdivided.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
From the definition of secrecy outage probability given in
(46), by applying the total probability theorem, PAnJso can be
expressed as
PAnJso = Pr{Cs < Rs|Φ = Φd}Pr{Φ = Φd}︸ ︷︷ ︸
`1
+ Pr{Cs < Rs|Φ = Φo}Pr{Φ = Φo}︸ ︷︷ ︸
`2
(80)
First, we evaluate the secrecy outage in DEH mode. Recall
that no secret data is transmitted in DEH blocks, γD and γE
hence both equal zero, and further, Cs equals 0. As Rs is
positive, it can be inferred that Pr{Cs < Rs|Φ = Φd} = 1.
Therefore we have `1 = Pr{Φ = Φd}. Invoking the indepen-
dence between the channel condition and the energy condition,
and also combining (21) and (44), we can obtain
`1 = 1− Pr{(CSD ≥ Rs) ∩ (ε[k] ≥ Eth)}
= 1−
(
1− FHSD
(
2Rs − 1
PS/σ2D
)) L∑
i=τ
ξFD,i (81)
Next, we evaluate the secrecy outage in OEH mode. Con-
sidering that Cs and CSD are not independent with each other,
but both are independent with the energy random variables, we
recast `2 as,
`2 = Pr{(Cs < Rs) ∩ (CSD ≥ Rs) ∩ (ε[k] ≥ Eth)}
= Pr{(Cs < Rs) ∩ (CSD ≥ Rs)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
`A
L∑
i=τ
ξFD,i (82)
Substituting (1), (46) and (48) into (82), and performing basic
mathematical manipulations, we obtain
`A
= Pr
{(
HSD <
(1 + γE)2
Rs − 1
κ1
)⋂(
HSD ≥ 2
Rs − 1
κ2
)}
= Pr
{
2Rs − 1
κ2
≤ HSD < (1 + γE)2
Rs − 1
κ1
}
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ (1+γE)2Rs−1
κ1
2Rs−1
κ2
fHSD (HSD)fγE (γE)dHSD dγE (83)
where fHSD (·) represents the PDF of HSD and
κ1 ,
PS
(1− ρ)PJσ2err/(Nt − 1) + σ2D
, κ2 ,
PS
σ2D
(84)
Substituting (20) together with (53) into (83), and applying
[36, Eq. (3.352.4) and (3.353.2)] to solve the resultant inte-
grals, we derive `A as
`A =

exp
(
− 2Rs−1κ2ΩSD
)
if Nt = 2
− σ2Eβ1PSΩSE exp
(
− 2Rs−1κ1ΩSD
)
Ψ1(1, µ,
Nt−1
ϕ )
−ϕβ21 exp
(
− 2Rs−1κ1ΩSD
)
Ψ1(2, µ,
Nt−1
ϕ )
exp
(
− 2Rs−1κ2ΩSD
)
if Nt ≥ 3
−σ2Eβ
Nt−1
1
PSΩSE
exp
(
− 2Rs−1κ1ΩSD
)
×Ψ2(Nt − 1, µ, β1)
−ϕβNt1 exp
(
− 2Rs−1κ1ΩSD
)
Ψ2(Nt, µ, β1)
(85)
Therefore, substituting `A into (82) and combining with
(81), after some basic mathematical manipulation, we obtain
the final result in (54), thus completing the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
From the definition of the probability of non-zero secrecy
capacity given in (47), by applying the total probability
theorem, PAnJnzsc can be expressed as
PAnJnzsc = Pr{Cs > 0|Φ = Φd}Pr{Φ = Φd}︸ ︷︷ ︸
`3
+ Pr{Cs > 0|Φ = Φo}Pr{Φ = Φo}︸ ︷︷ ︸
`4
(86)
Again, as no secret is transmitted in DEH mode, Pr{Cs >
0|Φ = Φd} = 0. Therefore, we have `3 = 0. And similar to
(82), we can recast `4 as
`4 = Pr{(Cs > 0) ∩ (CSD ≥ Rs) ∩ (ε[k] ≥ Eth)}
= Pr{(Cs > 0) ∩ (CSD ≥ Rs)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
`B
L∑
i=τ
ξFD,i (87)
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Substituting (1), (47) and (48) into (87), and performing basic
mathematical manipulations, we obtain
`B
= Pr
{(
HSD >
γE
κ1
)⋂(
HSD ≥ 2
Rs − 1
κ2
)}
= Pr
{(
HSD >
γE
κ1
)⋂(γE
κ1
≥ 2
Rs − 1
κ2
)}
+ Pr
{(
HSD ≥ 2
Rs − 1
κ2
)⋂(γE
κ1
<
2Rs − 1
κ2
)}
=
∫ ∞
κ1(2Rs−1)
κ2
∫ ∞
γ1
κ1
fHSD (HSD)fγE (γE)dHSD dγE
+
∫ κ1(2Rs−1)
κ2
0
∫ ∞
(2Rs−1)
κ2
fHSD (HSD)fγE (γE)dHSD dγE
(88)
Substituting (20) together with (52) and (53) into (89), and
applying [36, Eq. (3.352.4) and (3.353.2)] to solve the resultant
integrals, we derive `B as
`B =

(
σ2E
PSΩSE
Ψ1(1, µ2, β1 + β2) if Nt = 2
+Ψ1(2, µ2, β1 + β2)
)
×ϕ−1e−β2µ2
+ exp
(
− 2Rs−1κ2ΩSD
)
FγE (β2)
(
σ2E
PSΩSE
Ψ2(Nt − 1, µ2, β1 + β2) if Nt ≥ 3
+(Nt − 1)Ψ2(Nt, µ2, β1 + β2)
)
×βNt−11 e−β2µ2
+ exp
(
− 2Rs−1κ2ΩSD
)
FγE (β2)
(89)
Therefore, substituting `B into (87), after some basic mathe-
matical manipulation, we obtain the final result in (57), thus
completing the proof.
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